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th 2010. 2    The Labor Market in the Great Recession 
Since December 2007, labor market conditions in the United States have deteriorated dramatically. 
The depth and duration of the decline in economic activity have led many to refer to the downturn 
as the Great Recession. In this paper, we document the adjustment of the labor market during the 
recession, and place it in the broader context of previous postwar downturns. What emerges is a 
picture of labor market dynamics with three key recurring themes:  
1.  From the perspective of a wide range of labor market outcomes, the 2007 recession represents 
the deepest downturn in the labor market in the postwar era.  
2.  Until recently, the nature of labor market adjustment in the current recession has displayed a 
notable resemblance to that observed in past severe downturns. 
3.  During  the  latter  half  of  2009,  however,  the  path  of  adjustment  has  exhibited  important 
departures from that seen in prior deep recessions. 
These broad conclusions arise from a detailed investigation of the behavior of labor market stocks 
and flows over the course of the downturn. Our point of departure in section 1 is to document the 
evolution of key labor market indicators—unemployment, employment, labor force participation, 
and hours—during the recession. No matter what indicator of labor market activity we consider, the 
deterioration of labor market conditions during the 2007 recession is the worst on record since the 
late 1940s. Rates of unemployment among all the major subgroups of the labor market have reached 
postwar  highs.  From  the  perspective  of  the  labor  market,  the  2007  recession  is  truly  a  Great 
Recession. 
As noted above, we nonetheless observe that many dimensions of the evolution of these key 
indicators mirror those seen in past recessions. Labor force participation has declined, reflecting the 
modest  procyclicality  observed  in  many  postwar  recessions;  the  relative  contributions  of  the 
intensive and extensive margins to the decline in total labor input typify the conventional one third 
hours to two thirds bodies split observed in the past; and the constellation of demographic groups 
most  affected—young,  male,  less-educated,  workers  from  ethnic  minorities—is  reminiscent  of 
previous downturns.  
It is well-known that changes in aggregate unemployment in the United States mask substantial 
variation  in  underlying  worker  flows,  a  point  emphasized  by  Blanchard  and  Diamond  (1990). 
Reflecting this, in section 2 we investigate the sources of increased unemployment by analyzing the Michael Elsby, Bart Hobijn, and Ayșegül Șahin    3 
 
behavior of unemployment flows. This reveals that both increased unemployment inflows as well as 
declines in the rate at which workers flow out of the unemployment pool  play crucial roles in 
accounting for the recent upswing in unemployment. As in previous severe recessions, the initial 
ramp-up in unemployment was accompanied by a sharp rise in inflows. In contrast to the claims of 
recent literature on unemployment flows (Hall, 2005; Shimer, 2007), elevated rates of inflow in 
times of recession appear not to be a relic of past downturns, but rather a distinctive feature of 
severe recessions, both old and modern. The behavior of the outflow rate also mirrors that observed 
in past deep recessions: As the wave of inflows has receded in the latter stages of the current 
recession, the outflow rate has continued to fall. Reflecting the distinctive severity of the downturn, 
recent data has seen the outflow rate reach a postwar low. 
Measures of unemployment flows among labor force groups yield an important message on the 
sources of disparate trends in unemployment across labor force groups: Greater levels and cyclical 
sensitivity of joblessness among young, low-skilled minority workers, both in this and in previous 
downturns, are driven predominantly by differences in rates of entry into unemployment across 
these  groups.  In  sharp  contrast,  a  striking  feature  of  unemployment  exit  rates  is  a  remarkable 
uniformity in their cyclical behavior across labor force groups—the declines in outflow rates during 
this and prior recessions are truly an aggregate phenomenon. 
In the remainder of section 2, we take advantage of a unique opportunity to assess the role of 
labor turnover in the recession. This is the first full upswing in unemployment covered by the new 
Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS), which reveals some stark findings. In contrast 
to the behavior of unemployment inflows, rates of separation of workers from employers have not 
risen in the 2007 recession. This is suggestive of a hypothesis noted by Hall (2005): increases in 
unemployment inflows may have little to do with increased rates of job loss, but merely are a 
symptom  of  declining  rates  of  job  finding  among  potential  job-to-job  movers.  Our  analysis  of 
JOLTS  data  points  to  a  different  story:  Increased  inflows  into  unemployment  are  driven 
predominantly by a change in the composition of separations toward layoffs, which are likely to 
result in unemployment, and away from quits, which most often involve people who flow to a new 
job  upon separation. Job loss has  played  a key role in  driving increased unemployment in  the 
recession. 4    The Labor Market in the Great Recession 
We close our analysis in section 3 with an assessment of the outlook for the recovery of the 
labor market in the wake of the current downturn. Motivated by the recent subsidence of inflows 
into unemployment and the historic declines in the exit rate from unemployment, we emphasize the 
importance of a rebound in the outflow rate for future reductions in unemployment and highlight a 
potential cause for concern that has developed in recent data. The postwar U.S. labor market has 
been characterized by two remarkably stable aggregate relationships: the negative comovement of 
unemployment  and  vacancies—the  Beveridge  curve—and  the  positive  association  between  the 
outflow rate from unemployment and the vacancy-unemployment ratio, a point noted by Shimer 
(2005). The latter half of 2009 has witnessed a break from these relations, with unemployment 
rising  higher  than  implied  by  the  historical  Beveridge  curve,  and  the  outflow  rate  from 
unemployment falling significantly below the path implied by the past relation with the vacancy-
unemployment ratio.  
The resemblance of these trends to the similar breakdown in match efficiency that accompanied 
the European unemployment problem of the 1980s raises the concern of persistent unemployment, 
or hysteresis, in U.S. unemployment going forward. We consider a range of possible sources that 
might lead to hysteresis, including sectoral mismatch, extension of unemployment insurance (UI) 
benefits, duration dependence in unemployment outflow rates, and persistence in unemployment 
brought  about  by  reductions  in  the  rate  of  worker  flows,  what  Blanchard  (2000)  has  termed 
sclerosis.  Recent  data  point  to  two  warning  signs  going  forward.  First,  the  historic  decline  in 
unemployment outflow rates has been accompanied by a record rise in long-term unemployment. 
We show that this is likely to result in a persistent residue of long-term unemployed workers with 
relatively weak search effectiveness, depressing the strength of the recovery. Second, conventional 
estimates  of  the  impact  of  UI  duration  on  the  length  of  unemployment  spells  suggest  that  the 
extension of Emergency Unemployment Compensation starting in June 2008 is likely to have led to 
a modest increase in long-term unemployment in the recession. Nonetheless, we  conclude that, 
despite these adverse forces, they have not yet reached a magnitude that would augur a European-
style hysteresis problem in the U.S. economy in the long run.  Michael Elsby, Bart Hobijn, and Ayșegül Șahin    5 
 
1. Basic Facts about the Labor Market in the 2007 Recession 
The recession that started in December 2007 has been severe according to many measures, not least 
in terms of its effect on the labor market. In this section, we review the recent behavior of some of 
the main aggregate measures of labor market outcomes, and place the deterioration in labor market 
conditions of the current downturn in the broader historical context of previous postwar recessions.   
1.1 Unemployment, Employment, Labor Force Participation and Hours 
The main labor market indicator that we will focus on for much of this paper is the unemployment 
rate. To set the stage, Figure 1 displays the published time series for the civilian unemployment rate 
from Current Population Survey (CPS) data. The current recession is a very prominent feature of 
this series. Unemployment rose from a pre-recession minimum of 4.4 percent to reach 10.1 percent 
in  October  2009.  This  increase—5.7  percentage  points—is  the  largest  postwar  upswing  in  the 
unemployment rate. It dwarfs the rise in joblessness in the two most recent recessions in 1990 and 
2001, when in each case unemployment rose by approximately 2.5 percentage points. It dominates 
even the severe recession of 1973/4 (4.25 percentage points) as well as the combined effects of the 
double recession of the early 1980s (5 percentage points). There is little doubt that the present 
downturn is the deepest postwar recession from the perspective of the labor market.
1  
In what follows, we will closely examine the rise in unemployment in the present downturn. But 
it is helpful at this point to place the increase in joblessness in the broader context of other related 
labor market indicators. We consider two sets of measures: First, the relation between the rise in 
unemployment and the decline in employment during the downturn; and second, the role of declines 
in employment relative to hours per worker in accounting for the contraction in total labor input. 
The decline in employment. The unemployment rate at a given point in time   can be related to 
the level of employment  , and the labor force  , via the simple identity  . This 
identity suggests a simple metric for gauging the relative roles of variation in employment and labor 
force participation in accounting for the upswing in unemployment, since 
                                                 
1 While the current Great Recession is the most severe postwar recession, it is important to note that, as is true of all recent 
recessions, the current ramp-up in the unemployment rate is dwarfed by that witnessed during the Great Depression: In 1929, the 
unemployment rate stood at 3.2 percent, rising to 25.2 percent by 1933, a 22 percentage point rise in four years. Indeed, such is the 
extremity of the Great Depression that adding it to any plot renders the postwar variation in joblessness very difficult to perceive. 6    The Labor Market in the Great Recession 
  ,  (1) 
where   denotes the working-age population. The increase in the unemployment rate over the 
course of a recession can be decomposed into parts accounted for by logarithmic variation in the 
labor force participation rate and the employment-population ratio respectively. 
This exercise is performed in Figure 2. It plots the cumulative log deviations from trend of the 
published time series for the employment-population ratio and the labor force participation rate 
from  the  CPS  for  the  last  six  recessions.  Figure  2  has  two  related  messages.  First,  the  record 
upswing in the unemployment rate observed in Figure 1 is mirrored by a record contraction in 
employment:  Employment  has  declined  relative  to  trend  by  7  log  points  since  the  start  of  the 
recession, dominating the severe recession of the mid 1970s, as well as the joint effects of the 
double recession of the early 1980s. 
A second message of Figure 2 is that, rather than contributing to the rise in unemployment, a 
reduction in labor force participation of around 2 log points has muted the rise in joblessness in the 
current recession. Figure 2 also reveals that the current recession is no exception in this respect: 
Almost  all  of  the  downturns  prior  to  2007  also  exhibit  a  mild  procyclicality  of  labor  force 
participation.  
An interesting aspect of the response of labor force participation in this recession is that it seems 
to have had two stages. Daly, Hobijn, and Kwok (2009a) emphasize that during the first part of the 
recession the labor force participation rate remained unexpectedly high. Since May 2009, however, 
the labor force participation rate fell by 1.7 percentage points, its steepest decline since the 1950s. 
Unemployment  and  GDP  (Okun’s  Law).  One  of  the  most  robust  aggregate  statistical 
relationships  for  the  U.S.  economy  is  the  negative  comovement  between  changes  in  the 
unemployment  rate  and  growth  in  GDP—Okun‘s  (1962)  Law.  Figure  3  displays  a  version  of 
Okun‘s  Law  updated  to  include  the  current  recession.  It  plots  the  deviation  from  trend  of  the 
unemployment rate against the percentage deviation from trend of GDP using the CBO‘s estimates 
of the NAIRU and potential output up to January 2010.
2 The dashed line is the regression line based 
on the observations from 1949 through 2007, excluding the Great Recession. In the absence of large 
movements in potential output and the NAIRU, Okun‘s Law implies that for every 2 percent that 
output falls below trend, the unemployment rate will increase by about 1 percentage point.  
                                                 
2 Detrended unemployment and output data based on Hodrick-Prescott filtered series yield very similar results. Michael Elsby, Bart Hobijn, and Ayșegül Șahin    7 
 
This rule of thumb has performed remarkably well in accounting for the evolution of Okun‘s 
Law in the first part of the 2007 recession through 2009Q1, as indicated by the bold squares in 
Figure 3. Thus, as we have noted of other dimensions of the 2007 downturn, the adjustment of the 
labor market until the second quarter of 2009 is by no means an outlier relative to past recessions. 
The  last  nine  months  of  2009,  however,  have  witnessed  an  important  departure  from  the 
historical  path  of  Okun‘s  Law:  Even  though  overall  economic  activity,  as  measured  by  GDP, 
rebounded  in  the  second  half  of  2009,  the  unemployment  rate  continued  to  rise.  This  recent 
divergence between output and the labor market can be traced to the high level of average labor 
productivity growth during that period, resulting in an increase in the unemployment rate in 2009 
that surprised policymakers and forecasters alike.
3 The exceptionally strong productivity growth 
during the onset of the recovery also occurred during the jobless recoveries that followed the 
previous two recessions. We revisit the implications of this for the outlook in section 3.
4  
Hours  vs.  bodies.  The  evidence  presented  thus  far  has  pertained  solely  to  measures  of  the 
number of persons in or out of work, and not to the number of hours worked per employed person. 
Here we summarize the behavior of each of these measures, and identify their relative importance in 
driving the contraction in total labor input during the current downturn. Our point of departure is 
another simple accounting identity, namely that total labor input  is the product of employment 
 and hours per worker  . It follows that the logarithmic decline in total hours worked during the 
recession may be decomposed into the sum of the respective logarithmic declines in   and . 
Figure 4 performs this simple accounting exercise using data on employment and weekly hours 
per worker in the nonfarm business sector from the Bureau of Labor Statistics‘ Labor Productivity 
and Costs program.
5 It plots the cumulative log declines in employment and hours per worker for 
each postwar recessionary downturn in total labor input.
6 Total labor input has declined by 10 log 
points in the current recession, again more than in any other postwar recession.  
                                                 
3 For a detailed analysis of the recent behavior of Okun‘s Law, see Gordon (2010). 
4 Nalewaik (2010) suggests that deviations from Okun‘s Law are less severe when one considers Gross Domestic Income, i.e. an 
income-based measure of output, rather than GDP, which is based on the expenditure side of the national accounts. 
5 The BLS series identifiers used for employment and weekly hours per worker are respectively PRS85006013 and PRS85006023. In 
constructing these series, the BLS combines data from the Current Employment Statistics and the CPS. Employment here includes 
both payroll employees as well as self-employed and unpaid family workers. 
6 The recession dates used for constructing Figure 4 differ slightly from the official NBER recession dates. They correspond to the 
quarters around the NBER recession dates over which total hours worked are observed to decline.  8    The Labor Market in the Great Recession 
An interesting aspect of Figure 4 is that, while the 2007 recession is unusual in its severity, the 
adjustment of the labor market bears an important resemblance to that observed in prior recessions. 
Figure 4 highlights this on two dimensions. First, we observe that reductions in hours per worker 
prevail in the early stages of the recession, with contractions in employment becoming dominant 
later on. Second, Figure 4 reiterates the message of Figure 2 that employment has fallen by 7 log 
points, but additionally reveals that hours per worker have contracted by 3 log points. Thus, there 
has been something close to a 70:30 bodies/hours split to the decline in total labor input over the 
course of the 2007 recession. This is in line with the conventional wisdom, since at least Okun 
(1962),  that  around  two-thirds  of  the  cyclical  variation  in  labor  input  is  accounted  for  by  the 
extensive  margin.  Reiterating  this  point,  Figure  4  reveals  that,  across  the  last  six  recessions, 
variation in employment accounts for between 50 and 80 percent of declines in total hours. 
1.2 Who has been hit hardest?  
Underlying the acute surge in joblessness documented in Figures 1 through 4 is a rich degree of 
heterogeneity in the structure of unemployment across different groups of the labor force. Here we 
document this heterogeneity in the experience of unemployment across groups in the labor force, 
focusing on four dimensions of heterogeneity: gender, age, race and educational attainment.  
To assess the quantitative importance of these differences, Table 1 reports the ratio of the rise in 
each  group‘s unemployment rate to  the  rise in the overall unemployment  rate  for the last  five 
downturns using data from the CPS. If the rise in unemployment were spread uniformly across 
different subgroups of the labor market, the ratios in Table 1 would all equal 1. We find that male, 
younger, less educated workers, as well as individuals from ethnic minorities, experience steeper 
rises in joblessness during all recessions, including the most recent one.
7  
An interesting aspect of the results in  Table 1 is that the current recession is by no means an 
exception in terms of its gender bias.  While many commentators on the present downturn have  
emphasized its character as a  mancession,  Table  1  reveals  in  contrast  that  all  recessions  have 
affected male workers disproportionately more; the mancession is not a new phenomenon. Şahin, 
Song, and Hobijn (2009) show that this can be traced to the fact that industries in which male 
                                                 
7 This echoes the findings of an abundant literature that has documented differences in the cyclical sensitivity of different 
demographic groups (see Clark and Summers, 1981, Gomme, Rogerson, Rupert, and Wright, 2004, Kydland, 1984, Mincer 1991, 
for example). Michael Elsby, Bart Hobijn, and Ayșegül Șahin    9 
 
workers are concentrated, such as construction and durable goods manufacturing, are particularly 
sensitive to the cycle. 
1.3 Accounting for the Composition of the Labor Force  
Heterogeneity  in  the  experience  of  unemployment  across  labor  force  groups  is  an  important 
characteristic  of  joblessness  in  the  current  recession.  Recent  decades  have  witnessed  dramatic 
changes  in  the  composition  of  the  labor  force.  We  focus  here  on  one  particular  dimension  of 
composition  that  has  a  crucial  bearing  on  historical  comparisons  of  unemployment  rates:  age 
structure. The labor force has become older since the 1980s as the baby boom generation has aged, 
a point emphasized by Shimer (1998, 2001).
8 Accounting for such compositional changes can paint 
a different picture of aggregate unemployment trends because these different labor force groups are 
systematically more or less likely to experience spells of unemployment. 
We implement a simple method for controlling for the impact of changes in the age composition 
of the labor force on trends in aggregate unemployment, by fixing the labor force shares  for each 
age group to their level at some reference date , and tracing out the implied composition-adjusted 
unemployment series. Figure 5 performs this exercise using the most recent labor force  shares to 
construct composition-adjusted series. This reveals an interesting  finding: Accounting for changes 
in  the age  composition  of  the labor  force  leads  to  a  substantial  downward  revision  of  past 
unemployment rates. Figure  5  reveals that  the age-adjusted unemployment rate has reached its 
highest level in the postwar period. 
                                                 
8 An online appendix that accompanies this paper presents composition adjustments for the full interaction of age, gender, race and 
education, as well as for each dimension individually. While changing gender composition has had very little impact, composition  
by race and education plays a role. The influx of immigrants since the 1970s that has led to a greater fraction of Hispanic workers 
in the labor force, who in turn are more likely to experience an unemployment spell. On the other hand, increased educational 
attainment since the 1980s has shifted the structure of the labor force toward better educated workers who face lower 
unemployment rates on average (see Farber and Western, 2010, for more on this). Shimer (1998) cautions against adjustments for 
educational composition, however. Workers with higher unobserved ability are likely to face lower unemployment rates 
conditional on education. As workers become more educated over time, the average ability of each education group will decline, 
leading to an increase in that group‘s unemployment rate. In addition, if the educational distribution shifts, employers may simply 
revise the educational requirements of jobs, leading to no real effect on the unemployment rate. 10    The Labor Market in the Great Recession 
2. Labor market flows in the recession 
Another defining characteristic of the U.S. labor market is that it is in a state of continual flux. Even 
when the aggregate economy is in a tranquil state, many workers flow in and out of employment 
and unemployment. In times of recession, these flows come into focus as proximate determinants of 
increases in joblessness: Does unemployment rise as a result of increased inflows as workers lose 
their jobs? Or does it rise because unemployed workers increasingly fail to find new jobs? Or is it 
some combination of the two? 
Based on the shallow downturns of 1990 and 2001, recent research has argued that the nature of 
labor market adjustment in times of recession has radically shifted in recent years. Hall (2005) 
states that ―In the modern U.S. economy, recessions do not begin with a burst of layoffs.‖ Echoing 
this,  in  his  study  of  unemployment  flows,  Shimer  (2007)  concludes  that  ―Fluctuations  in  the 
employment exit probability are quantitatively irrelevant during the last two decades.‖
9 Instead, 
increased  unemployment  duration,  or  a  decline  in  the  rate  at  which  workers  flow  out  of  the 
unemployment pool, is argued to drive the entirety of contemporary unemployment variation.  
In contrast, a long line of research on labor market flows prior to the last two recessions came to 
the conclusion that cyclical ramp-ups in unemployment are driven by both margins.
10 More recent 
work has revived this conclusion, and identified a clear pattern  to unemployment flows in times of 
recession: Increases in unemployment are preceded by sharp rises in unemployment inflows, 
followed by more prolonged periods of elevated unemployment duration.
11 The conclusion of that 
literature pointed towards cyclical ramp-ups in unemployment being driven by both margins, with 
inflows being relatively more dominant early on in recessions. 
The current downturn provides an opportunity to assess these conclusions: Is a diminished role 
of job loss a feature of modern recessions, or of shallo w recessions? To get a sense for this, we 
explore updated estimates of unemployment transitions from a variety of data sources. 
                                                 
9 Shimer (2007) uses the term ―employment exit probability‖ to refer to the probability of entering unemployment. We do not use this 
terminology because employment exit can be taken to mean a flow from employment to either unemployment or nonparticipation, 
of which the latter does not involve an inflow into unemployment, and may even be taken to mean any separation from 
employment, which would also include job-to-job flows. 
10 See, among others, Perry (1972), Marston (1976), Blanchard and Diamond (1990), and Baker (1992). 
11 See, Braun, De Bock, and DiCecio (2006); Davis (2006); Elsby, Michaels, and Solon (2009); Fujita and Ramey (2009); Kennan 
(2006); and Yashiv (2008). Michael Elsby, Bart Hobijn, and Ayșegül Șahin    11 
 
2.1 The Ins and Outs of Unemployment in the Current Recession 
A first glimpse of the dynamics of unemployment flows can be obtained from published time series 
from  the  CPS.
12  Shimer (2007)  describes  a  method that uses monthly series on the number 
employed, the number unemployed, and the number unemployed for fewer than five weeks to infer 
the rates at which workers enter unemployment, and unemployed workers exit unemployment. His 
point of departure is the following description of the evolution of the unemployment stock  : 
  ,   (2) 
where   and   are respectively the inflow and outflow rates,   is the labor force, and   indexes 
months.
13  
The goal of the analysis is to relate variation in the unemployment rate   to variation 
in the flow hazards   and . To that end, we first need  to estimate these flow rates. Following 
Shimer (2007), we compute the monthly outflow probability,  
  ,   (3) 
where   is the stock of workers who report having been unemployed for less than one month.
14 
Intuitively, the term inside the brackets is the fraction of the unemployed in month   that remains 
unemployed the next month, the complement of which is the monthly outflow probability. This can 
then be mapped into a Poisson outflow hazard rate  . 
Obtaining an estimate of the inflow rate is slightly more involved. Assuming that the flow 
hazards,   and  , and the labor force,  , are constant between surveys, one can solve equation (1) 
forward one month to obtain: 
  .  (4) 
                                                 
12 Throughout the remainder of this section we focus on unemployment flows estimated from CPS time series, rather than the 
longitudinally-matched monthly CPS microdata (the so-called ―gross flows‖ data). This choice is informed by the fact that there 
are important measurement issues that accompany the use of the gross flows data, including spurious transitions driven by 
measurement error in reported labor market states in consecutive monthly surveys, non-random attrition from the sample, and 
discrepancies between published changes in aggregate labor market stocks and those implied by the gross flows.  
13 An implicit assumption underlying equation (2) is that all inflows into unemployment originate from employment,  . In fact, 
as we will see in what follows, a substantial fraction of inflows originate from nonparticipation in the U.S. We relax this 
simplifying assumption in section 2.3 below. 
14 As noted by Polivka and Miller (1998) and Abraham and Shimer (2001), the published time series on short term unemployment 
from the BLS displays a discontinuous decline following the CPS redesign in 1994, as a result of a change in the way 
unemployment duration was recorded. We correct the published post redesign series for short term unemployment by rescaling it 
by a factor of 1.16. See Elsby, Michaels, and Solon (2009) for more detail.  12    The Labor Market in the Great Recession 
Here unemployment is a weighted average of the flow steady state level of unemployment 
  and  last  month‘s  unemployment  ,  with  weight  given  by  the  monthly  rate  of 
convergence  to  steady  state,  .  Since  we  observe  the  labor  force  and 
unemployment stocks in each month, and with an estimate of the outflow rate  in hand, equation 
(4)  is  a  nonlinear  equation  that  can  be  solved  for  the  inflow  rate  .  As  emphasized  by 
Shimer (2007),  this  procedure  for  estimating    implicitly  corrects  for  a  time  aggregation  bias 
arising from inflows within a given month exiting prior to the next month‘s survey. 
Figure 6 plots quarterly averages of the estimated monthly time series for the rates of inflow to 
and  outflow  from  unemployment,  using  the  most  recent  CPS  data  up  to  2009  Q4.  Figure  6 
highlights  a  number  of  interesting  properties  of  the  dynamics  of  unemployment  flows  in  past 
recessions. First, as emphasized in the entirety of research on unemployment flows, both old and 
new,  the  outflow  rate  from  unemployment  is  markedly  procyclical,  exhibiting  systematic  and 
prolonged  downswings  in  all  recessions.  Second,  the  inflow  rate  into  unemployment  is 
countercyclical, exhibiting sharp upswings at the onset of all recessions that tend to subside quickly 
by the end of the recession. Third, the response of unemployment inflows in the relatively mild 
recessions that began in 1990 and 2001 appears to be muted in comparison to other episodes, a 
point that echoes the recent conclusions of Hall (2005, 2007) and Shimer (2007).  
At this point, we can return to the question that motivated this part of our analysis: To what 
extent is the cyclical ramp up in unemployment accounted for by changes in these flow hazard 
rates? Elsby, Michaels and Solon (2009) provide a simple method for answering this question. Their 
starting point is an observation that has been noted by many analysts of U.S. unemployment flows: 
That the unemployment rate in the U.S. is very closely approximated by its flow steady state value, 
that is 
  .
15  (5) 
Equation  (5) is useful for our purposes because it provides a link between variation in the 
unemployment stock and variation in the constituent flow hazard rates. Elsby, Michaels and Solon 
(2009) show that simple log differentiation of this approximate relation implies: 
                                                 
15 To see why this is so, note that the sum of the inflow and outflow rates   typically exceeds 0.5 on a monthly basis in the U.S. 
An implication is that the rate of convergence to flow steady state   in equation (5) above tends to be very high in practice. 
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  , where    (6) 
Equation (6) has a simple message: To compare changes in inflow and outflow rates on an equal 
footing with respect to changes in unemployment, all one needs do is compare the logarithmic 
variation in each of the flow hazards. 
The results from applying this decomposition of unemployment variation for each recession 
since 1973 are depicted in Figure 7. We identify start and end dates for each recessionary ramp-up 
in unemployment since 1973, and compute the cumulative logarithmic difference in inflow and 
outflow rates relative to their respective start of recession values. In many ways, the message of 
Figure 7 confirms the qualitative picture suggested in Figure 6: In all recessions, inflows account 
for a substantial fraction of unemployment variation early on in the downturn, and then subside in 
the latter stages of the recession. In contrast, the contribution of the outflow rate becomes more 
dominant as each recession progresses. 
For our current focus, there are two noteworthy aspects of Figures 6 and 7. First, mirroring the 
conclusions of Section 1 on labor market stocks, the behavior of unemployment flows in the initial 
stages of the current downturn bears a striking resemblance to the dynamics of unemployment flows 
in  past  severe  recessions.  The  early  quarters  of  the  current  ramp-up  in  unemployment  are 
characterized by a wave of inflows that has since receded partially.  The contribution of the inflow 
rate is almost identical to that observed in the 1974 downturn. Thus, returning to the question that 
motivated this analysis, sharp spikes in the rate of inflow into unemployment appear to be a feature 
of severe recessions, rather than of old ones. 
Figures 6 and 7 also shed light on what‘s new about the current downturn. Figure 6 reveals that 
the unemployment outflow rate fell to an historic low of 24 percent in 2009 Q3. This is not just a 
consequence of the secular trend toward declining outflow hazards shown in Figure 6: Figure 7 
shows that the exit rate fell by over 80 log points in the current downturn, more than in any of its 
postwar counterparts, echoing the conclusion of Section 1 that this is the deepest postwar downturn 
in  labor  market  outcomes.  We  return  to  this  phenomenon  in  Section  3,  when  we  discuss  its 
implications for a recovery.  14    The Labor Market in the Great Recession 
2.2 Unemployment Flows by Labor Force Group 
In  Section  1.2  we  saw  that  changes  in  unemployment  rates  have  differed  substantially  across 
different demographic groups during the 2007 recession, with some groups being hit harder by the 
downturn  than  others.  We  now  look  into  the  sources  of  this  heterogeneity  by  examining 
unemployment flows across groups. 
We focus on the same four dimensions of heterogeneity as in Section 1.2. Estimation of the flow 
hazards for each labor force group mirrors the aggregate analysis above.
16 Figure 8 displays the 
series for the inflow and outflow hazards for each group. They are plotted as twelve-month moving 
averages to smooth out noise induced by the greater sampling variance that accompanies these more 
disaggregated series. In accordance with the message of equation (5), the flow hazards are drawn on 
log scales.  
Figure 8 has a rich set of implications for the structure of joblessness across groups. Perhaps its 
most prominent feature is th e remarkable uniformity in both the levels and cyclical behavior of 
outflow rates across groups. Most striking are the series by education group, for which the exit rates 
are virtually indistinguishable since 1976.
17 In the current recession, the log declin e in outflow 
hazards has been almost identical across groups. Reductions in the outflow rate that accompany 
recessions,  from  both  a  qualitative  and  a  quantitative  perspective,  are  truly  an  aggregate 
phenomenon. 
In stark contrast, there are large differences in rates of inflow into unemployment across groups. 
Comparison of these with the heterogeneity of unemployment across groups in Table 1 reveals a 
close link: The same groups that face high unemployment rates—young workers, less-educated 
workers,  and  workers  from  ethnic  minorities—also  face  markedly  high  rates  of  entry  into 
unemployment.  The message of this comparison is that the bulk of the large differences in the level 
of unemployment across groups observed in  Table 1 are driven by differences in each  group‘s 
propensity to enter unemployment, rather than differences in the duration of their spells.
  
                                                 
16 The Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes seasonally unadjusted estimates of unemployment by duration starting from the mid 
1970s by gender, age and race. As in Section 1.2 above, for education groups we use CPS monthly microdata files from January 
1976 on to construct measures of unemployed less than five weeks, unemployed and employed by education groups. We then 
seasonally adjust the raw data using the Census‘ X12 procedure, and compute the monthly outflow and inflow rates using the 
analogues to equations (3) and (4) that hold for each group. As before, we also correct for discontinuities in the series for short-
term unemployment by group induced by the redesign of the CPS in 1994.  
17 This finding echoes the findings of Mincer (1991).  Michael Elsby, Bart Hobijn, and Ayșegül Șahin    15 
 
In addition to revealing large differences in the levels of unemployment across groups, Table 1 
also demonstrated that some groups face greater increases in unemployment in times of recession. 
What can account for this? Well, recalling equation (5) above, we can write the change in group  ‘s 
unemployment rate as 
  , where    (7)  
One  possibility,  then,  is  that  these  groups  simply  faced  larger  logarithmic  changes  in  their 
constituent flow hazards. Inspection of Figure 8 reveals that this is precisely what accounts for the 
surge in the unemployment of men relative to women in the current recession: While male and 
female outflow rates have been essentially identical, men have faced a much larger increase in 
inflows, a point emphasized by Şahin, Song, and Hobijn (2009).
18 
But this is not the whole story. For age, race and education groups, there is little difference in 
the cyclicality of unemployment flows, and whatever differences exist tend to predict the  opposite 
of the pattern depicted in Table 1. For example, outflow rates among young workers aged 16 to 24 
have fallen just as mu ch as for older workers, and their inflow rates have hardly risen in the 
recession. Yet, in Table 1, the unemployment rate among 16 to 24 year-olds rose substantially more 
than aggregate unemployment. 
The answer lies in equation (7) above: For values of the group-specific unemployment rates   
observed in Table 1 (i.e. lying below one half),  is increasing in  . Thus, the higher the 
unemployment rate faced by an individual group, the greater the responsiveness of the group‘s 
unemployment rate to changes in its constituent flow hazards. Intuitively, equation (7) implies that 
changes in the flow hazards have a logarithmic influence on unemployment: A doubling of, for 
example, the inflow hazard, leads to an almost doubling of the unemployment rate. The higher the 
unemployment rate, then, the more cyclically sensitive is an individual group‘s rate of joblessness.  
Inspection of Figure 8 reveals that this observation can account entirely for the greater cyclical 
sensitivity of unemployment among youth, ethnic minorities and the less-educated in the current, 
and indeed all recessions over the sample period. Combining this with our earlier observation that 
the  bulk  of  the  differences  in  unemployment  levels,  and  thereby  of  ,  across  groups  can  be 
                                                 
18 Şahin, Song, and Hobijn (2009) explore this phenomenon using longitudinally-linked monthly CPS microdata to estimate labor 
market flows between unemployment, employment and nonparticipation. Consistent with Figure 8, they find that, for men, the 
employment to unemployment transition rate increased more than it did for women, while unemployment to employment 
transition rate declined proportionally across gender groups. 16    The Labor Market in the Great Recession 
attributed to differences in rates of entry into unemployment yields an interesting implication: The 
majority of the variation in both the levels and the cyclical sensitivity of group unemployment rates 
can be accounted for by differences in the level of inflow rates across groups.  
2.3 The Role of Job Loss in the Recession 
The previous sections have shown that unemployment inflows are a proximate driving force of the 
increase unemployment in the current recession, and that they play an important role in accounting 
for cross sectional differences in the level and cyclicality of unemployment across groups. It is 
tempting to conclude that this constitutes evidence that job loss has played a key role in the 2007 
recession.  In  this  section,  we  delve  into  this  observation  to  uncover  the  mechanisms  that  can 
account for these elevated inflow rates.  
We address two important conceptual distinctions. First, as mentioned above, estimates of the 
unemployment inflow rate,   in equation (4), are based on the implicit assumption that all inflows 
into  the  unemployment  pool  originate  from  employment  rather  than  nonparticipation.  In  fact, 
around 40 percent of the unemployment stock is accounted for by individuals (re-)entering the labor 
force. Consequently, estimates of   conflate two economically distinct driving forces for entry into 
unemployment: flows from nonparticipation brought about by the process of labor force entry, and 
flows from employment to unemployment that are associated with elevated rates of job loss. 
Second, job loss is often taken to mean a separation from an employer rather than an inflow into 
the unemployment pool, the distinction being that workers can, and frequently do, line up new jobs 
without an intervening unemployment spell, a point that has been made since Mattila (1974), and 
more recently by Fallick and Fleischman (2004) and Nagypál (2008). In what follows, we bring to 
bear a range of additional data that speak to these distinctions. 
Unemployment  Inflows  by  Reason.  It  is  possible  to  distinguish  among  different  sources  of 
unemployment flows using publicly available monthly time series on the number unemployed by 
reason for unemployment, and the number unemployed for fewer than five weeks by reason from 
the  CPS.  We  focus  on  three  main  reasons  for  unemployment:  job  losers  (layoffs),  job  leavers 
(quits), and labor force entrants.
19 An important benefit of this distinction is that the former two 
                                                 
19 It is possible to further decompose job losers into temporary vs. permanent layoffs, and labor force entrants into new entrants and 
reentrants. We do not distinguish among these principally because the redesign of the CPS in 1994 led to substantial changes in the 
definition of these subgroups, and associated discontinuities in the respective time series. See Polivka and Miller (1998). Michael Elsby, Bart Hobijn, and Ayșegül Șahin    17 
 
categories originate from employment, while the latter originates from nonparticipation. This allows 
us  to  distinguish  between  employment  to  unemployment  associated  with  job  loss,  and 
nonparticipation to unemployment flows that accompany labor force entry. 
Elsby, Michaels and Solon (2009) describe how these data can be used to infer estimates of 
unemployment flows by reason for unemployment.
20 Figure 9 plots estimates of the inflow rates by 
reason. As emphasized by Elsby et al., all of the observed countercyclicality in the aggregate inflow 
rate noted above is driven by a markedly countercyclical layoff inflow rate. The  quit inflow rate is 
comparatively very low and mildly procyclical, thereby dampening the observed countercyclicality 
of aggregate inflows. In addition, inflows due to labor force entry are essentially acyclical, further 
moderating the rise in the aggregate inflow rate in times of recession.  
The  impression  of  Figure  9,  one  that  is  a  unifying  theme  of  the  present  paper,  is  that  the 
behavior of inflows by reason in the current downturn is again very reminiscent of past recessions. 
The behavior of the layoff inflow rate in particular suggests a simple partitioning of recessionary 
episodes: Deep recessions, such as those starting in 1974, the Volcker disinflation period of the 
early 1980s, and the present downturn are characterized by markedly elevated layoff inflow rates; 
milder recessions, such as those starting in 1990 and 2001, are typified by a more modest increase 
in inflows due to layoffs. Again, the message of the 2007 recession is that severe modern recessions 
share many of the characteristics of deep recessions in the past. 
Evidence from Labor Turnover. The fact that unemployment inflows have risen markedly in the 
current  recession,  and  that  layoff  inflows  have  dominated  that  trend,  is  suggestive  of  job  loss 
playing a key role in driving cyclical rises in unemployment. But it is not necessarily conclusive. As 
noted by Hall (2005), elevated rates of inflow into unemployment need not be the outcome of 
elevated rates of separation from employers: Increased inflows in times of recession can occur if 
workers  increasingly  are  unable  to  line  up  new  jobs  immediately  upon  separation.  Under  this 
alternative  hypothesis,  countercyclical  inflows  are  a  symptom  of  declining  rates  of  job  finding 
among potential job-to-job movers, rather than of elevated rates of job loss. 
                                                 
20 There is a slight difference between the methods used by Elsby, Michaels and Solon (2009) to compute inflow rates by reason for 
unemployment and that used by Shimer (2007) to compute the aggregate inflow rate. Elsby et al. use a discrete time correction for 
time aggregation bias, while Shimer uses a continuous time correction. Results in Elsby et al. suggest this difference is not 
quantitatively important. 18    The Labor Market in the Great Recession 
The current recession provides a unique opportunity to assess these competing hypotheses—it is 
the first full recession covered by the new Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS).
21 
This is crucial for our present purpose because it provides a representative measu re of the rate at 
which employed workers separate from their employers in the U.S.  More formally, denote the 
separation rate from employers by  , and the employment to unemployment inflow rate by  . 
Note that a measure of the latter is given by t he sum of the layoff and quit inflow rates presented 
above,  . It follows that we can relate   and   simply according to: 
  ,  (8) 
where    denotes the probability that a wor ker who separates from her employer in month  t 
subsequently flows into unemployment.  
Figure 10 plots the published JOLTS time series for the separation rate   and the employment 
to unemployment transition rate   implied by CPS data. This reveals a stark set of facts. First, 
there is a substantial difference between the separation rate and the employment-to-unemployment 
transition  rate,  a  fact  that  is  suggestive  of  the  abundance  of  job-to-job  transitions  in  the  U.S. 
economy, as emphasized by Fallick and Fleischman (2004) and Nagypál (2008). Second, while the 
employment to unemployment inflow rate has increased in the current downturn, the total rate of 
separation of workers from employers has, if anything, fallen slightly. At first blush, then, it would 
seem that the elevated rates of inflow into unemployment during the current recession are driven 
wholly by reductions in the rate at which workers line up new jobs. The results of Figure 10 would 
seem  to  provide ample  support for  Hall‘s (2005)  hypothesis that job  loss  has  little to  do with 
increased unemployment in times of recession. 
We argue that such a conclusion would be premature. It has long been recognized that the 
relatively  modest  cyclical  behavior  of  total  separations  masks  substantial  cyclicality  in  its 
constituent elements—quits and layoffs. Moreover, these tend to display markedly opposite cyclical 
patterns:  The  quit  rate  from  employers  moves  procyclically,  while  the  layoff  rate  moves 
countercyclically.
22 Figure 11 plots economy-wide layoff and quit rates from JOLTS for the current 
                                                 
21 JOLTS data are available only back to December 2000. Because of this, they miss part of the ramp-up in unemployment in the 
2001 recession.  
22 See, for example, Slichter (1919), Woytinsky (1942), Akerlof, Rose, and Yellen (1988), and Anderson and Meyer (1994). Michael Elsby, Bart Hobijn, and Ayșegül Șahin    19 
 
downturn and  reveals  that, as  with  unemployment  flows,  the behavior of labor turnover in  the 
current recession is again remarkably consistent with historical trends in these series. 
Accounting for the distinction between quits and layoffs allows a more revealing investigation 
of the relationship between separations and unemployment inflows than in equation (6) above. The 
employment to unemployment transition rate can be decomposed as follows: 
    (9) 
where  subscripts    and    respectively  denote  layoffs  and  quits,    is  the  aggregate 
separation  rate,  and    is  the  share  of  layoffs  in  aggregate  separations.  Equation  (9) 
therefore highlights an additional channel by which employment to unemployment transitions may 
increase: through changes in the composition of separations that occur during recessions,  . 
Figure 11 clarifies this point. It depicts the quit separation rate   from JOLTS along with the 
quit inflow hazard into unemployment   derived from CPS data using the method described in the 
previous  section.  At  all  points  in  time,  workers  who  quit  their  previous  job  face  a  very  low 
probability of subsequently entering unemployment—   averages just 16 percent over the sample 
period. Job-to-job flows drive an important wedge between separations and unemployment inflows 
due to quits. It is for this reason that quits account for only a small fraction of unemployment 
inflows. In addition, the implied series for   displays no cyclical pattern: it has fallen steadily from 
approximately 20 percent in 2001 to 14 percent in 2009. These two observations—that   is small, 
and that it has not risen in the current downturn—account for why the contribution of quits to 
increased unemployment inflows is not significant in the current downturn. 
A quite different story holds for layoffs. Figure 11 shows that, at all points in time, workers laid 
off from their previous jobs face a very high probability of entering unemployment—   averages 
91 percent since 2001. Job-to-job flows do not appear to be prevalent among laid-off workers. 
Moreover, while the gap between the separation and inflow rates for layoffs closed in the early 
periods of the current downturn, the rise in   accounts only for a small fraction of the overall rise in 
unemployment inflows, perhaps one-quarter of the overall rise in the layoff inflow rate. 
Figure 11 therefore provides a unique perspective on the rise in unemployment inflows during 
the recession. As suggested by Hall (2005), elevated rates of entry into unemployment are not 20    The Labor Market in the Great Recession 
driven by increases in the overall rate at which workers separate from employers. But, in contrast to 
the  claims  of  recent  literature,  job  loss  nonetheless  plays  a  crucial  role  in  accounting  for 
recessionary  unemployment.  Instead,  a  different  picture  emerges:  Increased  inflows  into 
unemployment can be traced to a shift in separations during the recession toward layoffs, who are 
very likely to flow into unemployment. Increases in the layoff rate have played a central role in 
accounting for increased rates of entry into unemployment in the current recession. 
3. Outlook for recovery in the labor market 
Until  now,  we  have  concentrated  on  analyzing  the  behavior  of  labor  market  stocks  and  flows 
associated with the rise in unemployment in the 2007 recession. In this section, we turn to the 
prospects for the labor market going forward.  
Our point of departure is to return to Figure 6 which displays the behavior of unemployment 
flows during each postwar recession. Two features of Figure 6 provide a first glimpse of the central 
features that will guide the recovery. First, since the spike in the inflow rate has partially subsided, 
the key to any decline in unemployment in the future is a recovery of the outflow rate. Second, the 
decline in the outflow rate that has accompanied the 2007 recession has been much more severe 
than in past recessions. Thus, the recovery of the outflow rate is all the more salient in the present 
downturn for the future of the U.S. labor market.  
One can think of the relative strength of the rebound in the outflow rate as being determined by 
two things. First, how many new job openings will be created? Second, for a given increase in the 
number of vacancies, how quickly does the pool of unemployed find new jobs? 
3.1 Vacancy creation 
Job creation reflects the overall health of the economy and it is expected that as the aggregate 
activity recovers, vacancy creation will also start to increase. However, there are many factors that 
affect the timing and level of vacancy creation during recoveries.  
On the up side is the additional strength in vacancy creation due to the alleviation of the credit 
constraints that resulted from the financial crisis. Moreover, since the resolution of the financial 
crisis  is  likely  to  cause  a  substantial  decline  in  aggregate  and  individual  uncertainty,  firms‘ Michael Elsby, Bart Hobijn, and Ayșegül Șahin    21 
 
willingness to hire could increase significantly. In particular, it implies a drastic reduction in the 
probability of a detrimental aggregate economic outcome. As Bernanke (1983) points out, such a 
reduction in the probability of ―bad news‖ will increase the likelihood that firms make the decisions 
to invest and hire, which are costly to reverse. 
There are also reasons to imagine that explanations of the jobless recoveries of 1990-91 and 
2001 recessions are likely to be absent during the current episode. Willems and van Wijnbergen 
(2009) argue that labor hoarding can explain the jobless recoveries following the 1990 and 2001 
recessions. Labor hoarding is more likely during shallow recessions, but is much less likely during 
the current deep recession, which has exhibited sharp rises in rates of job loss. Similarly, Van Rens 
(2004) and Koenders and Rogerson (2005) have argued that firms used the previous two recessions 
as an opportunity to improve their organizational efficiency and productivity. Since the 2002 to 
2007 expansion was neither exceptionally long nor very strong, it seems that the forces that might 
have caused limited hiring after the 1990 and 2001 recessions are much less likely to have a large 
and persistent effect during this recovery. The strength in productivity growth in the second half of 
2009 that led to the deviation from Okun‘s Law depicted in Figure 3 may suggest that these forces 
are present during the ongoing recovery, though. 
     On the downside, there is potentially a large amount of unused capacity in the economy in terms 
of labor input that firms can tap into before needing to hire additional workers which could cause 
the firms to wait to create new jobs. Currently workers who work part-time but who would have 
preferred to work full-time make up 6.7 percent of those employed.  Daly, Hobijn, and Kwok 
(2009b), among others, have argued that the pace of hiring relative to output growth during the 
recovery could be slowed down because firms first increase the hours of those who are already 
employed but only part-time before they actually hire additional workers.  
Finally, there are reasons to suspect that labor market changes that have taken place in the last 
two decades will render such sharp reversals in the labor market less likely. For example, there has 
been  a  decline  in  firms‘  use  of  temporary  layoffs,  eliminating  the  possibility  of  increasing 
employment at low cost.
 23 In addition, the sharp recovery following the 1980s recession may have 
been aided by the reversal of the disinflationary monetary policy that instigated the recession in the 
first place, a feature the current recession does not share. 
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3.2 Match efficiency and the Beveridge Curve 
An important concern for the strength of the recovery is that, even if firms create new jobs, it will 
be harder to match workers with the appropriate job openings. The main reason for this concern is 
depicted  in  Figures  12  and  13.
24  Figure  12  illustrates  the relationship between the  logarithmic 
deviations from Hodrick-Prescott filtered trends of vacancies and the unemployment rate, i.e. the 
Beveridge curve. Observations in the plot are classified in terms of ‗not during a recession‘, ‗during 
a recession before 2007‘, and ‗during the 2007 recession.‘ The bold dashed line is the regression 
line based on all observations before 2008 and the light dashed lines delimit the 90% confidence 
interval  around  this  regression  line.  As  noted  by  Shimer  (2005),  historically  there  has  been  a 
remarkably stable negative association between job openings and the unemployment rate. As can be 
seen from the figure, during the fall of 2009 the unemployment rate has been higher than would be 
implied by the historical Beveridge curve.  
Figure 13 investigates the sources of this deviation from past trends. It plots the logarithmic 
deviations from Hodrick-Prescott filtered trends of the outflow rate,  , and the ratio of the number 
of vacancies to the number of unemployed persons, often referred to as labor market tightness. 
Shimer (2005) refers to the remarkably stable positive relationship as the matching function. Figure 
13 reveals that the recent divergence from the Beveridge curve can be traced to the outflow rate 
being substantially lower than would be suggested by the matching function relationship observed 
over much of the postwar period. The substantial decline in the outflow rate witnessed in the latter 
part of 2009 in Figure 6 therefore represents a significant outlier in the context of the historical 
matching function. 
The breakdown of the Beveridge curve and matching function relations in Figures 12 and 13 is 
evocative  of  the  similar  breakdown  in  match  efficiency  that  occurred  during  the  European 
unemployment problem of the 1980s and 1990s (see, for example, Figure 11 in Layard, Nickell, and 
                                                 
24 Figures 12 and 13 are updated versions of Figures 4 and 6 in Shimer (2005). For expositional purposes we plot monthly rather than 
quarterly data. To account for this change in frequency, we use a value of 2700000 for the smoothing parameter of the Hodrick-
Prescott filter which is used to filter the trend in log levels of all variables. This corresponds to the value that Shimer (2005) uses 
corrected for the change in frequency using the factor for stock variables derived by Ravn and Uhlig (2002). The vacancy series is 
based on Barnichon (2009), who builds a vacancy posting index for the years 1951 to 2009 by combining information from the 
total print and online help-wanted advertising indexes with JOLTS. As discussed in Shimer (2005), the growth of internet vacancy 
posting since the mid 1990s, and newspaper consolidation and Equal Opportunities legislation in the 1960s, can make it hard to 
compare the level of vacancies over time. Shimer uses a low-frequency HP filter to remove these trends. In addition, the series we 
use from Barnichon (2009) are robust to a range of possible higher-frequency paths for the diffusion of internet vacancy postings. 
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Jackman, 1991). This raises the concern that the U.S. economy will be plagued by the persistently 
high unemployment  rates  that these European economies  experienced  well into the 1990s—so-
called hysteresis. In practice, hysteresis can arise through a number of channels. We highlight a few 
of these possibilities here, and provide a sense of their relevance in the current downturn. 
Mismatch. One potential reason for a persistent reduction in match efficiency is a mismatch 
between the skills and the skill requirements of job openings.
25  For example, Groshen and Potter 
(2003) have argued that the jobless recoveries after the 1990 and 2001 recessions were in large part 
due to structural reallocation of workers across sectors in the economy. They claim that this 
reallocation led to a mismatch in skill-mix that resulted in a slower adjustment of the labor market 
than in previous recessions. More recently, Phelps (2008) has reiterated this concern in relation to 
construction and finance workers in the 2007 recession.  
This reallocation argument suggests that workers that were employed in sectors in structural 
decline will have a harder time finding jobs than other workers. That is, it implies a divergence in 
outflow rates from unemployment between those who  previously were employed in industries in 
structural decline versus those of other workers. Figure  14 addresses this question. It shows the 
unemployment outflow hazard rates conditional on the industry in which a person was employed at 
the start of the unemployment spell. If anything, we have actually seen a convergence of these 
outflow rates rather than the divergence implied by the structural reallocation argument.
26 
Besides a mismatch in skills, an additional concern is the potential emergence of geographical 
disparities in the location of workers and job openings.  This has come into focus in the current 
recession amid concerns that, given the decline in house prices that accompanied the recession, job 
applicants are more reluctant to apply for and accept jobs that are not within commuting distance 
from their current residence and would require them to sell their homes.  Ferreira, Gyourko and 
Tracy (2009) find that homeowners with negative equity are less likely to move by using data from 
                                                 
25 Related to this argument, Aaronson, Rissman, and Sullivan (2004) point out that there did not seem to be a higher need to 
reallocate labor across sectors in the 1990 and 2001 recessions, which were accompanied by jobless recoveries, than during earlier 
ones. Valletta and Cleary (2009) find the same for the 2007 recession. 
26 While suggestive, this need not imply that skill mismatch is not an issue in the current recession. For example, it may be the case 
that skill mismatch nevertheless exists, but that it occurs within industry classifications. In such a case, disaggregation by industry 
would be too broad to detect an increase in skill mismatch. However, estimation of further disaggregated unemployment flows is 
limited by the increased sampling variance that accompanies additional splitting of the CPS sample. 24    The Labor Market in the Great Recession 
American  Housing  Survey  for  1985-2005.
27  Their results cannot be easily extrapolated to the 
current  recession  but  still  point   to  a  potentially  important  negative  effect  of  housing -related 
problems on the labor market recovery since geographic mobility is an important part of adjustment 
to shocks in the U.S. labor market as emphasized by Blanchard and Katz (1992).
28 
Sclerosis and duration dependence. Associated with the record rise in the unemployment rate 
has  been  a  surge  in  long-term  unemployment.  The  fraction  of  the  labor  force  that  has  been 
unemployed for more than six months has increased by a staggering 3.5 percentage points to a 
postwar high of 4 percent, 1.5 percentage points higher than the previous peak in 1983. Likewise, 
average unemployment duration has risen to an historic high of 30 weeks, the mirror image of the 
historic low in the unemployment exit rate noted in section 2. Here we explore the effects of these 
depressed  unemployment  flows  on  the  evolution  of  the  recovery—what  Bentolila  and  Bertola 
(1990) and Blanchard (2000) have referred to as sclerosis in the European context.
29  
A  first  potential  source  of  sclerosis  relates  to  the  effect  of  reductions  in  the  level  of 
unemployment outflow rates on the speed of adjustment of the unemployment rate. This point is 
clarified by equation (4) above. There, reductions in the pace of worker reallocation,  , lead to 
reductions in the responsiveness of unemployment to changes in flow steady-state unemployment, 
.  This  matters  for  the  recovery  of  unemployment  in  the  wake  of  the  current 
recession: A by-product of the historically low outflow rate reached during the 2007 recession is 
that the rate of convergence of unemployment to its flow steady state,   in equation (4), also has 
arrived at a postwar low. Thus, even if firms start to hire again, the outflow rate rebounds, and flow 
steady-state unemployment recovers, the actual unemployment rate may exhibit a delayed reaction. 
Quantitatively, however,  we find that  these effects  are likely to  be small. While the  recent 
trough in the monthly outflow rate of 0.24 is a record low by historical U.S. standards, it remains 
very high relative to the standards of the European unemployment problem of the 1980s, when 
                                                 
27 Some commentators on the current recession have pointed to evidence that the rate of domestic migration in the U.S. has reached a 
postwar low in recent data. However, it is difficult to discern how much of this is associated with the recession—rates of internal 
migration have been falling in the U.S. as a secular phenomenon since the mid-1980s (see, for example, Frey, 2009). 
28 This implication of Blanchard and Katz (1992) has been the source of some dispute, however. See, for example, Rowthorn and 
Glyn (2006). 
29 We use the term sclerosis in the sense of Blanchard (2000): ―Flows decrease, individual unemployment duration increases, and so 
does the proportion of long-term unemployed.‖ Michael Elsby, Bart Hobijn, and Ayșegül Șahin    25 
 
monthly outflow rates fell below 0.08 in many European economies.
30 To put this in perspective, 
the half-life of a deviation of unemployment from flow steady state, which stood at a little over one 
month prior to the current downturn in the U.S., has risen to just under three months in recent data 
for the U.S., but is not even close to the values of nine months to a year experienced in Europe in 
1980s and early 1990s.
31 
A second source of sclerosis is the persistence in the decline of the outflow rate itself. Previous 
literature has identified the duration composition of unemployment to be a key potential driving 
force for such persistence (Blancha rd, 2000). Specifically, a pervasive feature of unemployment 
flows in the U.S. is that average rates of outflow from unemployment decline with the duration of 
unemployment spells—so-called negative duration dependence—a point noted since Kaitz (1970), 
and made more recently by Shimer (2008).
32  Several explanations have been proposed for such an 
outcome, including the depreciation of skills of the unemployed (Pissarides, 1992; Ljungqvist and 
Sargent,  1998);  the  ranking  of  job  applicants  by  the  duration  of  their  unemployment  spell  
(Blanchard and Diamond, 1994); and statistical discrimination  by employers against the long-term 
unemployed (Lockwood, 1991).  
Here we highlight potential reasons for why such duration dependence can matter for the 
evolution of the labor market over the cycle. Noting that the aggregate outflow probability   can be 
expressed as a share-weighted sum of the outflow  probabilities faced by each duration group  , 
,  it follows that changes in the aggregate outflow  probability  over time can be 
decomposed according to 
    (10) 
Equation  (10)  summarizes two potential concerns over the role of duration dependence in the 
recession. First, in the context of the surge in long-term unemployment encountered in the present 
recession,  it  is  tempting  to  hypothesize  that  those  with  longer  unemployment  spells  have 
increasingly become disenfranchised from the labor market, leading to a disproportionate decline in 
                                                 
30 Hobijn and Șahin (2009, Table 1) report average duration distributions of unemployment spells, and Elsby, Hobijn and Șahin 
(2009) document the behavior of inflow and outflow rates over time for a broad number of OECD countries. 
31 These are computed based on the estimates in Elsby, Hobijn and Șahin (2009, Figure 3). 
32 As noted by Kaitz (1970), this may take the form of ―spurious‖ duration dependence that arises from dynamic selection (Salant, 
1977), or ―true‖ duration dependence whereby the accumulation of unemployment duration has a causal effect on exit rates. 26    The Labor Market in the Great Recession 
their outflow rates. Such an effect would be captured by the first term in parentheses in equation 
(10).  
Figure 15 addresses this by presenting time series for a range outflow rates for workers with 
different  unemployment  durations.  Specifically,  we  use  longitudinally-linked  monthly  CPS 
microdata from 1976 to compute the probability that an unemployed worker of a given duration 
exits unemployment within a month. Figure 15 plots the associated hazards for durations equal to 
less than 1, 1 to 3, 3 to 6, and 6 or more months. Consistent with the literature on negative duration 
dependence in unemployment exit rates, the hazards for exiting unemployment decline as duration 
rises. More importantly for the hypothesis under discussion, however, there is no evidence that exit 
rates have fallen disproportionately among the high duration unemployed in the last five recessions. 
Rather, just as we saw in Section 2.2 on unemployment flows by group, the cyclicality of outflow 
rates displays an extraordinary regularity across duration groups. In sum, there appears to be little 
evidence to suggest that elevated rates of joblessness are a symptom of diminished employment 
opportunities of the long-term unemployed in this, or any other recession.
33 
However, equation (10) also reveals that duration dependence can affect the cyclicality of the 
aggregate outflow rate via changes in the duration structure of unemployment,  . Formally, a 
simple description of the stock of unemployed workers of duration   over time   is 
  ,  (11) 
with initial condition   given by the unemployment inflow derived in section 2. It follows that the 
unemployment share of duration group   is given by 
  .  (12) 
Equation (12) has significant implications for the evolution of the outflow rate during the recovery. 
It reveals that the unemployment shares of the high -duration unemployed are persistent, and in 
particular depend on the outflow rates faced by low-duration unemployed that prevailed in the past. 
Intuitively, even if outflow rates  move uniformly across duration groups during  the recession, the 
historic  decline  in  outflow  rates  as  a  whole  can  result  in  a  p ersistent  residue  of  long -term 
                                                 
33 Interestingly, this conclusion mirrors the results of Machin and Manning (1999) in their detailed analysis of the long-term 
unemployment problem in Europe. In their words: ―while the longterm unemployed do leave unemployment at a slower rate than 
the shortterm unemployed, this has always been the case and their relative outflow rate has not fallen over time.‖  Michael Elsby, Bart Hobijn, and Ayșegül Șahin    27 
 
unemployed workers who exit unemployment slowly, depressing aggregate outflow rates in the 
future. 
To  illustrate  the  potential  importance  of  this  mechanism  Figure  16  presents  an  illustrative 
exercise: It simulates the future evolution of the aggregate outflow rate in the wake of the current 
recession, assuming that outflow rates for each duration group, as well as the aggregate inflow rate, 
rebound in proportion to that witnessed in the 1983/4 recovery. For purposes of comparison, Figure 
16 also plots an alternative path for the aggregate outflow rate, indexed to the actual recovery 
observed in 1983/4. 
Figure 16 suggests that the accumulation of long-term unemployed individuals in the present 
recession can indeed have quantitatively important effects on the rebound in the outflow rate during 
the recovery. While the aggregate outflow rate rebounded by around 30 percent in the 1983-84 
recovery, the simulated path for the upcoming recovery augurs a more lackluster 15 percent. By this 
reckoning,  the  overhang  of  long-term  unemployed  workers  would  yield  a  recovery  in 
unemployment half as rapid as that seen in the mid-1980s. 
The difference between the 1983-based and the simulated counterfactual path of the aggregate 
finding rate is largely due to the low levels of the outflow rates at the end of 2009. Hence, even if 
these rates rebound at the same growth rate as in 1983, they would remain at a lower level than in 
1983 and this would lead to a higher average duration of unemployment, even in the long run. 
Though this is definitely a cause for concern, it is important to note that it is unlikely that this 
mechanism will lead to the degree of persistence in  the outflow rate that  led to  the  degree of 
hysteresis seen in European unemployment. The simple reason is that the long-term unemployed in 
the United States flow out of unemployment at a rate that is four times higher than the aggregate 
outflow rates in Continental Europe reported in Elsby, Hobijn, and Șahin (2009). 
The  role  of  Emergency  Unemployment  Compensation.  One  particularly  salient  reason  for  a 
temporary  decline  in  match  efficiency  relates  to  the  temporary  extension  of  Emergency 
Unemployment Compensation (EUC) that began in June 2008. In addition to the regular 26 weeks, 
one could be eligible to 53 additional weeks of EUC as long as the Congress continues to extend 
it.
34  Conventional  economic  theory  suggests  t his  lengthening  of  the  expected  duration  of 
                                                 
34 EUC is divided into four tiers (20 weeks, then 14, then 13, and finally another 6 weeks); one must reapply when each tier expires. 
In addition to these 53 extra weeks, most states offer Extended Benefits (EB) up to 20 weeks. The number claiming EB has been 
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unemployment benefits will place downward pressure on the unemployment outflow rate seen in 
Figure 13, as those searching for a job become more selective about which job offers they accept. 
Existing research on the effects of unemployment insurance benefits suggests that there is a 
strong positive relationship between the maximum duration of UI benefits and unemployment spell 
duration.
35 Estimates suggest that a one week increase in potential benefit duration  is associated 
with increases in the average duration of the unemployment spells of UI recipients of around 0.08 to 
0.20 weeks. According to these estimates,  then, a 53-week extension in potential benefit duration 
would be associated with a 4.2 to 10.6 week increase in unemployment duration among UI 
recipients.
36 Since the fraction of unemployed workers now claiming some form of UI benefits has 
averaged 50 percent in the current recession, this suggests something like a 2.1 to 5.3 week increase 
in overall unemployment duration. Over the course of the current recession, average unemployment 
duration surged from 16.5 weeks to 30.2 weeks, a 13.7 week increase. This back-of-the-envelope 
calculation therefore suggests that EUC can account for as much as 15 to 40 percent of the rise in 
aggregate unemployment duration, a potentially substantial effect. In terms of the unemployment 
rate, this corresponds to between 0.7 and 1.8 percentage points of the 5.5 percentage poi nt rise in 
the unemployment rate witnessed in the current recession. 
There are reasons to believe , however, that the effect of extended  UI benefits in the current 
recession on the duration of unemployment is likely to be at the lower end of these estimates. Many 
of the larger estimates of the effect of benefit duration on unemployment duration are based on data 
from the 1970s and 1980s when temporary layoffs, wh o are more responsive to the generosity of 
UI, comprised a larger fraction of unemployment. In addition, many of the larger estimates in the 
literature are based on empirical strategies that identify the effect of UI by exploiting differences in 
benefit schedules across states and time.  As Card and  Levine (2000) emphasize, a   potential 
difficulty of this approach is that many states extend UI benefits as a response to poor job finding 
prospects  in recessions, overstating  the true disincentive effect of the UI.
37  Indeed, Card and 
Levine‘s estimates based on an exogenous policy change lie at the bottom of the range of effects, 
suggesting a more modest impact of EUC. 
                                                 
35 See Card and Levine (2000), Katz and Meyer (1990), Krueger and Meyer (2002), Meyer (1990), and Moffitt (1985). 
36 Note that this calculation assumes that, upon entering unemployment, all unemployed workers anticipate that benefit duration will 
be extended by 53 weeks. In that sense it is an upper bound on the response. 
37Consistent with this, in their study of the effect of benefit duration for a policy change that is exogenous to labor market conditions, 
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Taken together, our analysis of the decline in match efficiency observed in the latter stages of 
the  current  recession  points  to  two  potentially  important  driving  forces:  The  existence  of  a 
substantial residue of long-term unemployed workers with relatively weak search effectiveness, and 
the extension of Emergency Unemployment Compensation. Taken separately, one might imagine 
that the temporary nature of EUC will imply that the labor market will recover as extended UI 
benefits are withdrawn, while the structural nature of the long-term unemployment problem will 
endure well into the recovery. However, there are likely to be important interactions between the 
two. A major impetus for the introduction of the EUC program was in fact the rise in long-term 
unemployment  that  accompanied  the  recession.  Thus,  an  enduring  long-term  unemployment 
problem could mean that the political will to withdraw EUC may take some time to materialize. 
4. Conclusion 
Our detailed analysis of the adjustment of the labor market in the current downturn reveals it to be 
the deepest deterioration in labor market outcomes on record in the postwar era. Every indicator of 
labor market activity suggests that the recession has been unique both in its depth and duration. 
Rates of joblessness among all groups in the labor market have reached historic postwar highs. 
There is little doubt that it is a Great Recession. 
Nonetheless, our analysis suggests that many of the features of labor market dynamics in the 
Great Recession until the latter half of 2009 are strikingly similar to those seen in earlier recessions. 
This  is  true  of  the  behavior  of  employment  and  labor  force  participation  rate,  the  use  of  the 
intensive vs. extensive margins in the adjustment of labor input, and in terms of the demographic 
groups most affected, with young, male, less-educated, workers from ethnic minorities being hit 
harder.   
In terms of the underlying flows, just as in prior deep recessions increased joblessness in the 
downturn can be traced to both increased rates of inflow, as well as increased duration, with inflows 
being  relatively more important  early  on in  the downturn. This suggests that the more modest 
response of unemployment inflows in the 1990 and 2001 recessions is a feature of mild recessions, 
rather than of modern ones.  30    The Labor Market in the Great Recession 
Further  analysis  of  worker  turnover  data  from  the  new  Job  Openings  and  Labor  Turnover 
Survey provides a unique perspective on the driving forces of job loss in the 2007 recession. Recent 
literature has emphasized the relatively acyclical behavior of the rate at which workers separate 
from  employers,  suggesting  that  job  loss  plays  only  a  limited  role  in  driving  recessionary 
unemployment.  Combining  data  from  JOLTS  and  the  CPS  reveals  that  increased  inflows  into 
unemployment  have  been  driven  predominantly  by  a  change  in  the  composition  of  separations 
toward layoffs, who are very likely to become unemployed, and away from quits, who are very 
likely to flow to a new job upon separation. Thus, contrary to recent claims, increases in layoffs 
have played a key role in driving increased unemployment in the recession. 
Despite the similarities of the labor market response in the early stages of the current recession 
with prior downturns, more recent evidence suggests there has been an important divergence with 
past trends. Most prominently, rates of exit of unemployed workers from joblessness have slowed to 
record levels, drawing into focus the importance of a rebound in outflow rates for the recovery. 
Recent data point to two key factors: The record rise in long-term unemployment associated with 
the recession is likely to yield a persistent overhang of workers facing long unemployment spells, 
slowing  the  recovery.  In  addition,  the  extension  of  Emergency  Unemployment  Compensation 
starting in June 2008 is likely to have led to a modest increase in long-term unemployment in the 
recession.  
Despite these unfavorable forces, recent data suggest that the problems facing the U.S. labor 
market going forward are unlikely to be as severe as the European-style hysteresis problem of the 
1980s. While the jobless in the U.S. are exiting unemployment at a historically slow rate, they 
nonetheless leave unemployment as much as four times faster than those in continental Europe in 
the 1980s. Looking ahead, then, a tentative expectation is for a lackluster recovery, but one not 
nearly as dismal as seen in Europe in the past. 
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1980  1981-1982  1990-1991  2001  Current 
Change in unemployment rate    1.9%  3.3%  2.3%  2.2%  5.5% 
Gender  Male  6.2%  1.42  1.19  1.13  1.14  1.19 
 
Female  6.3%  0.43  0.75  0.85  0.84  0.78 
Age  16-24  12.6%  1.58  1.28  1.57  1.68  1.67 
 
25-54  5.0%   1.0  1.02  0.92  0.98  0.99 
 
55+  3.6%  0.22  0.65  0.90  0.60  0.66 
Education  Less than High School  8.8%  1.36  1.61  2.03  1.31  1.60 
 
High School  5.4%  1.38  1.27  1.08  0.97  1.30 
 
Some College  4.3%  0.93  0.75  0.99  1.22  1.07 
 
College or Higher  2.6%  0.19  0.44  0.45  0.79  0.58 
Race  White  5.5%  0.96  0.92  0.87  0.87  0.91 
  Black  12.1%  1.30  1.67  1.40  1.86  1.29 
 
Hispanic  8.8%  ---  ---  1.67  0.90  1.35 
 
Asian  4.6%  ---  ---  ---  1.29   0.80 
               
Notes: Average unemployment rates are based on data from June 1976 to January 2010, except for Hispanics, for whom data are available only from January 1982 to January 
2010, and Asians for January 2000 to January 2010. 36    The Labor Market in the Great Recession 
 
Figure 1. Unemployment Rate, 1948-2009 
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Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics. Seasonally adjusted monthly data

































































































































































































Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and authors' calculations.
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Figure 3. Okun’s Law based on CBO output gap and NAIRU (1949-now) 
 
Figure 4. Hours vs. Bodies by Recession, 1973-2009 
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Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and Congressional Budget Office
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Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Productivity and Costs employment and weekly hours series.
Log change
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Figure 5. Age-Adjusted Unemployment Rate 
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Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and authors' calculations. Quarterly averages of monthly data.
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Figure 7. Contributions of Inflow and Outflow Rates by Recession, 1973-2009 







































































































































































































Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and authors' calculations.
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Figure 8. Unemployment Flows by Demographic and Educational Groups 
12-month moving averages of seasonally adjusted monthly data 
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Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and authors' calculations
(b) Inflow Rates by Age MonthlyHazard (log scale)
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Figure 8 - continued. Unemployment Flows by Demographic and Educational Groups 
12-month moving averages of seasonally adjusted monthly data 
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Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey, and authors' calculations
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Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survery, and authors' calculations
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Figure 9. Unemployment Flows by Reason for Unemployment 
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Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and authors' calculations. Monthly rates based on CPS and JOLTS data.
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Figure 11. Separation and Unemployment Inflow Rates: Quits vs. Layoffs 
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Figure 13. The Matching Function 
 































-1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Barnichon (2009), and authors' calculations 
Vacancy-unemploymentratio (log deviation from HP trend)







2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Source: Bureau of Labor Statisticsand authors' calculations, 12-month moving averages of non-seasonally adjusted data
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Figure 15. Unemployment Outflow Probabilities by Duration of Unemployment. 
 
Figure 16. Long-term unemployment and the Outflow Rate in the Recovery 
 
Note: Simulation of the recovery in the aggregate unemployment outflow rate in 2010/11 assuming that outflow rates by duration 
group recover at the same rate as witnessed in the 1983/4 recovery. For purposes of comparison, an index of the rebound in the 
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